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CLOSING THE DOOR ON ASYLUM-SEEKERS: 
PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL 
OPINION AFTER INS v. ELIAS ZACARIAS1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The civil war in Guatemala has taken a terrible toll. Since the 
mid-1970s, more than 100,000 civilians have been killed and an-
other 40,000 have disappeared.2 In addition, the war has created 
200,000 orphans and 50,000 widows.3 Like the conflicts in El Sal-
vador and Nicaragua during the past decade, it has resulted in a 
hemorrhage of displaced persons fleeing from the violence of their 
homeland.4 
One evening in January 1987, eighteen-year-old Jairo Elias 
Zacarias was approached by two guerrillas near his home in Olinte-
peque, Guatemala.5 The men wore handkerchiefs over their faces 
and carried machine guns.6 The guerrillas tried to persuade the 
teenager to join their ranks.7 When Elias Zacarias refused, the men 
warned him to "think it [over] well" and promised that they would 
come back for him.8 
Afraid that the guerrillas would return to "take me and kill 
me,"9 Elias Zacarias fled Guatemala in March 1987.10 On July 12, 
1987, he illegally entered the United States near Nogales, Arizona. ll 
He was immediately apprehended by officers of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS).12 
Elias Zacarias applied for asylum and the withholding of de-
portation, claiming that he faced persecution on account of his 
I 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). 
2 Stephen F. Gold, A Travesty of Justice, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 3, 1992, at 
18. 
SId. 
4 Gros Espiell et aI., Principles and Criteria for the Protection of and Assistance to Central 
American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Latin America, 2 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 
83,87 (1990). 
5 Tamar Lewin, Supreme Court May Decide Fate of Thousands Seeking Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 1992, at 28. 
6 Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Elias Zacarias, 
112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). 
7Id. 
BId. 
9 Respondent's Brief in Opposition app. at 5a, INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) 
(No. 90-1342). 
10 Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847. 
II Lewin, supra note 5, at 28. 
12Id. 
287 
288 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:287 
political opinion if returned to Guatemala. 13 The asylum-seeker 
based his claim on Ninth Circuit l4 case law that held forced recruit-
ment by guerrillas to be persecution on account of political opinion 
for the purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980.15 The Board of 
Immigration Appeals l6 (BIA or Board) denied relief, only to have 
that judgment overruled by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 17 
On January 22, 1992, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals' decision granting Elias Zacarias asylum 
and ordered him deported. IS The Court determined "persecution 
on account of ... political opinion" to be persecution on account 
of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's.19 In reaching 
that determination, the Court required that the asylum applicant 
offer some proof that the oppressor's motive for persecuting him 
or her was related to the alien's political stance.20 
In vindicating the BIA's position, the Supreme Court put an 
end to an eight-year long conflict between the Ninth Circuit and 
the Board over asylum eligibility for individuals who have been 
targeted for military service by insurgents fighting in their country's 
civil war. The decision also places an added burden on asylum 
applicants fleeing forced recruitment to provide evidence of their 
oppressors' motives. If generally applied to petitioners fearing per-
secution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
IS Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847. 
14 The Ninth Circuit has been very active in the area of immigration law in general and 
in asylum cases in particular. It handles a large number of the cases due to the presence of 
hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers living there and the location of a major INS 
detention center within its jurisdiction. Deborah Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in 
Asylum Jurisprudence: The Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 67, 68 n.6 (1989). In 1989 and 1990, the circuit handled half of the 
nation's immigration litigation. Aliens won 72% of the cases that reached the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. This compares with a 38% success rate for aliens in the other circuits. 
Susan Freinkel, INS, With New Attitude, Settles Six Class Actions; Offers 'Out of the Blue,' LEGAL 
TIMES, Jan. 27,1992, at 2. 
15 Refugee Act of 1980 [hereinafter the Act or Refugee Act], Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 
Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) amended the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter INA], Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. 
16 Aliens' claims for relief from deportation or exclusion are initially presented before 
immigration courts. The BIA hears appeals from these courts. The BIA's decisions are 
reviewed by the court of appeals of the circuit in which the claims arise. David A. Martin, 
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 
1313, 1316 (1990). 
17 Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 855 (9th Cir. 1990). 
18 INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992). 
19/d. at 816. 
2°Id. at 817. 
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particular social group, or political opinion,21 many meritorious 
asylum claims could fail for lack of such proof. 22 
There is evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court intends 
the Elias Zacarias decision to be broadly applied. In Canas-Segovia v. 
INS, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted asylum to two 
Salvadoran conscientious objectors fleeing punishment under a law 
of general applicability mandating military service for all men be-
tween the ages of eighteen and thirty.23 The Court of Appeals found 
the severe punishment usually inflicted on those who refuse to serve 
to constitute persecution on account of religion.24 On February 24, 
1992, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment granting asylum to 
the aliens and remanded it for further consideration in light of INS 
v. Elias Zacarias. 25 
This Note argues that the Elias Zacarias decision, which requires 
the alien to produce evidence of the persecutor's state of mind, 
contravenes the obligation of United States law to effectuate inter-
national standards of humanitarian relief. In Part II, the Note 
examines the recent history of U.S. refugee policy, together with 
the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the statutory 
language governing asylum claims. That examination demonstrates 
an intent to craft U.S. immigration law which domesticates United 
Nations standards. Part III discusses the case law culminating in 
the Supreme Court's decision. The discussion focuses on the conflict 
between the Ninth Circuit and the BIA over the interpretation of 
"persecution on account of ... political opinion" in the context of 
forced recruitment by guerrillas. Part IV discusses the Elias Zacarias 
decision and assesses its potential impact on subsequent asylum 
adjudication. Part V critiques the Elias Zacarias decision as contrary 
to the stated intent of U.S. refugee policy and international refugee 
law. Part VI examines alternatives to Elias Zacarias and argues for 
a return to the Mogharrabi standard as more closely conforming to 
United Nations standards. The Note concludes that in INS v. Elias 
Zacarias the Supreme Court erred in requiring asylees to provide 
proof of their persecutor's motives. 
21 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (defining refugees). 
22 See Lewin, supra note 5, at 28. The article reports that over 100,000 petitions for 
political asylum are pending. The majority of these are from citizens of Guatemala, EI 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Many involve instances of forced recruitment by insurgents. Id. 
23 Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S. 
Ct. 1152 (1992). 
24Id. at 729. 
25 INS v. Canas-Segovia, 112 S. Ct. 1152, 1152 (1992). 
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II. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 198026 
The purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 is to effectuate a 
coherent refugee policy which conforms to internationally recog-
nized standards of refugee lawY This is an attempt to graft the 
United Nations refugee definition and provision against forced re-
patriation onto an older practice of regarding refugee relief as an 
adjunct to U.S. foreign policy.28 It has not, however, produced a 
clearly reasoned approach to achieving the Act's goal of conferring 
a nondiscriminatory humanitarian benefit on exiles.29 One result: of 
this lack of clarity was the conflict over statutory interpretation that 
had arisen among the circuits and the BIA over forced recruitment 
as a form of persecution on account of political opinion for granting 
asylum. 30 
A. History of u.s. Refugee Policy from World War II to 1980 
For most of the period since the end of World War II, the 
United States' handling of refugee issues was basically a series of 
temporary responses to emergency situations.31 The U.S. govern-
ment refrained from a systematic application of a well thought-out 
policy.32 For the most part, legislative enactments in this area during 
the early Cold War period reflected immediate foreign policy ob-
jectives.33 The resulting legislation consequently lacked criteria for 
26 Refugee Act, supra note 15. 
27 Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the 
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 43 (1981). 
28 For example, the legislative history reveals that the Refugee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 
203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), was "designed to implement certain phases of American foreign 
policy. It is not intended to represent any precedent or commitment on the part ... of the 
Government of the United States .... " H.R. REP. No. 1069, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. I (1953), 
reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2122, 2123. 
29 Congress intended to conform U.S. law to the U.N. Convention. S. REp. No. 590, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). 
30 Central to this controversy is the acceptance of neutrality as a form of political opinion 
for the purposes of the Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals formulated the case law in 
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984). Other circuits have been 
ambivalent about following the Ninth Circuit's lead. M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 
1990) (declining to accept or reject neutrality as "political opinion" for statutory ground for 
refugee relief); Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 
(lIth Cir. 1990) (rejecting neutrality as political opinion for the purposes of Refugee Act); 
but see Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d I, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (setting forth circumstances when 
persecution of neutrals may constitute political opinion). 
3I Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 12. 
32 See id. at 12-13. 
331d. at 13. 
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determining refugee eligibility because the statutes granting refugee 
status varied with the changes in the international political climate.34 
For example, in 1953 the Refugee Relief Act conferred refugee 
status on individuals fleeing communist countries.35 In 1957, in the 
wake of the Suez Crisis, that act was amended to include countries 
of the Middle East.36 
The legislative history reveals that these enactments were not 
intended to have any precedential value, lest they inhibit the gov-
ernment's flexibility in conducting foreign policy.37 As a result, a 
rather haphazard approach evolved.38 Furthermore, U.S. refugee 
policy failed to incorporate the international standards set forth in 
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention).39 
In order to preserve its credibility within the international com-
munity, the U.S. government formulated a more cohesive refugee 
admissions policy, which was in line with the United Nations stan-
dards.40 The result was the Refugee Act of 1980.41 Principally, it 
incorporated the United Nations refugee definition,42 which Con-
gress intended to be geographically and ideologically nondiscrimi-
natory.43 The Act also codified the nonrefoulement obligations,44 
114 See id. 
S> Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953). 
56 Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957). 
37 Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 13 n.12. 
38 See id. at 4l. 
39 Opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 V.S.T. 6259, 189 V.N.T.S. 137. Although the 
Vnited States took an active role in the discussions leading up to the formulation of the 
document, it never became a signatory. This was due to various reasons not directly related 
to the contents of the Convention in its final form. Martin, supra note 16, at 1257. 
40 Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 4l. 
41 Refugee Act, supra note 15. 
42 According to Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Convention, a "refugee" is an individual who 
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." July 28, 
1951, 19 V.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 V.N.T.S. 137, 152, as modified by Article 1.2 of the Vnited 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter 1967 Protocol], Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 V.S.T. 6223, 6223, 606 V.N.T.S. 268, 268. 
43 Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 43, 60. 
44 The nonrefoulement provision is contained in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, 
which was incorporated into the 1967 Protocol. It mandates that refugees illegally present 
in signatory nations are not to be returned to countries where their lives or freedom would 
be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. July 28,1951, art. 33(1),19 V.S.T. 6259, 6276,189 V.N.T.S, 137, 
176. 
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which the United States assumed when it acceded to the 1967 
Protocol45 in 1968.46 Finally, the Refugee Act contained the newly 
enacted section 208(a),47 which gave a statutory basis to asylum 
proceedings for the first time.48 
The enactment of the Act, however, did not immediately 
achieve the dual goals of conformity to international standards and 
of more efficient organization that Congress intended.49 On its face, 
the incorporation of the United Nations refugee definition into the 
statute appeared to satisfy the first objective.50 The passage of time, 
though, revealed the existence of a significant discrepancy between 
the concepts that that language encapsulated and the then well-
established practice of conducting refugee relief programs in the 
shadow of U.S. foreign policy objectives.51 
B. Statutory Language 
In order for an alien, who is present within the United States 
or at its borders, to be eligible for asylum52 or for the withholding 
of deportation, 53 he or she must be determined by the Attorney 
General to be a "refugee" under the terms of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act54 (INA), as amended by the Act.55 Section 101(a)(42) 
of the INA defines "refugee" as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nation-
ality, or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and 
who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country because of perseqttion or a wellJounded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion. . . .56 
45 1967 Protocol, supra note 42. 
46 Martin, supra note 16, at 1259. 
47 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). 
48 Deborah Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the Refugee 
Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n.3 (1987). 
49 See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 64-66. 
50 See id. at 60. 
51 See id. at 72-73. 
52 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). 
53 INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). The Refugee Act extended this form of 
relief to aliens present at the border. Anker, supra note 48, at 2 n.3. 
54 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988) et seq. Aliens outside United States territory may also seek 
admission as refugees. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988) contains the provisions governing 
these procedures. 
55 Refugee Act, supra note 15. 
56 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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Once this determination has been made, the alien becomes eligible 
for asylum under INA section 208(a)57 and for the withholding of 
deportation under INA section 243(h).58 
Under section 208(a), a refugee establishes eligibility for a grant 
of asylum by demonstrating a "well-founded fear" of persecution.59 
An asylum applicant demonstrates this by showing that she or he 
risks a reasonable possibility of persecution in her or his homeland.60 
Although a petitioner may successfully demonstrate a well-founded 
fear, the Attorney General has the discretion to refuse to grant a 
refugee asylum in certain instances.61 Should the request be 
granted, the asylee is protected against deportation62 and becomes 
eligible for lawful permanent resident status after one year's resi-
57 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). 
58 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). Under § 243(h), the refugee establishes a claim for the 
withholding of deportation by showing that he or she will be exposed to a clear probability 
of persecution in the country to which the government is attempting to deport him or her. 
INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). The clear-probability standard is satisfied if the 
refugee demonstrates that it is more likely than not that he or she will be subject to perse-
cution. [d. at 429-30. Should the refugee satisfy the statutory burden of § 243(h), the 
withholding of deportation is mandatory. INA §243(h)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I) (1988). This 
form of relief, however, is country-specific, rather than general. Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. 
Dec. 311, 315 (BIA 1982). Even if the refugee defeats deportation to the persecuting country, 
he or she may be deported to any other country which will accept him or her. [d. (applicant 
protected from deportation to Afghanistan, but not from deportation to Pakistan). Moreover, 
a withholding of deportation does not confer permanent status in the United States. Anker 
& Blum, supra note 14, at 68 n.2. A non-deportable alien can live as a refugee in this country 
only as long as the threat of persecution persists. INA § 243(h)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) 
(1988). 
59 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (well-founded fear standard appli-
cable to § 208(a) claims). This standard is equivalent to the one used to determine refugee 
status under INA § IOI(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 10 I (a)(42)(A) (1988). See supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
60 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423-24, 448. The test for this standard is "a reasonable 
possibility of persecution." Martin, supra note 16, at 1264 and accompanying notes. 
61 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). The limits of discretion have been evolving 
ever since asylum relief was codified by the Refugee Act of 1980. Initially, discretionary 
denials of asylum were limited to otherwise qualified aliens who fraudulently avoided orderly 
refugee procedures. Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 31l, 316 (BIA 1982) (fraudulently 
obtained passport triggers denial of asylum). In 1987 the BIA adopted a more generous 
standard, which takes into account the totality of the circumstances occasioning an alien's 
fraudulent entry into the country. Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473, 475 (BIA 1987) 
(fraudulent entry triggers no discretionary denial of asylum to alien with family in the United 
States); Anker & Blum, supra note 14, at 70-72. In INS v. Doherty, the Supreme Court 
recently declined to decide whether foreign policy considerations may also form the basis 
for discretionary denials of asylum. 112 S. Ct. 719, 724 (1992). The Court, however, held 
that the Attorney General has broad discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen depor-
tation proceedings. [d. 
62 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1l58(a) (1988). 
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dence.63 This statutory language was further specified by a subse-
quent Supreme Court decision in which the Court relaxed the 
standard that the BIA was applying to asylum claims. 
In 1987 the Supreme Court held in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca a 
"well-founded fear of persecution" standard applicable to section 
208(a) claims.64 While declining to define that standard precisely,65 
the Court noted that it was more generous than the clear-probability 
standard,66 which the Court had previously found applicable to the 
withholding of deportation claims under section 243(h).67 It is sig-
nificant that the Court framed its decision as reflecting relevant 
distinctions in the 1967 Protocol.68 The Court found that the leg-
islative history of the Act indicated that Congress had intended to 
write these United Nations provisions into law.69 
The effect of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision was to read section 
208(a) as making eligibility requirements for refugee status coter-
minous with those for asylum grants.70 This interpretation, in turn, 
created "a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretion-
ary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a 
statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in 
danger '.' .. "71 In authorizing a more generous standard for asylum 
eligibility than for the withholding of deportation, however, the 
Court implied that the Attorney General was free to rely on his or 
her discretionary power in denying eligible refugees asylum relief. 72 
In light of the Court's formulation of the Attorney General's 
discretionary power, many observers initially predicted that Cardoza-
Fonseca would move the focus of asylum claims away from a debate 
65 INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1988). 
64 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
65ld. 
66 ld. at 423-24. The well-founded fear standard is composed of two components. The 
subjective element is the alien's belief that he or she is at risk. ld. at 430-31. The objective 
element is evidence that the risk is a reasonable possibility. ld. at 440. The Court implied 
that as little as a one-in-ten chance of persecution was sufficient to satisfy the standard's 
requirements. See id. 
67 INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). 
68 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424 .. 
69 ld. ("The Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a 
discretionary grant of asylum ... mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, whieh provided the motivation for the enactment of the 
Refugee Act of 1980."). 
70 See id. at 423-24. Compare U.N. Definition supra note 56 and accompanying text. INA 
§ 208(a), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a) (1988) applies this definition to those seeking asylum "if the 
Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of 
§ 1l01(a)(42)(A) of this title." 
71 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424. 
72ld. at 444-45, 450. 
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over legal standards and onto credibility determinations73 and dis-
cretionary denials. 74 That result, however, did not occur.75 Although 
the Board initially resisted judicial efforts to broaden asylum eligi-
bility by applying too strict a standard to 208(a) claims,76 it did not 
follow the Court's suggestion of expanded use of discretionary de-
nials." Rather, after being corrected by the Cardoza-Fonseca Court, 
the BIA7s began narrowly interpreting the statutory grounds for 
determining what constitutes persecution based on the five areas 
set forth in the Act in order to achieve the same end, as the history 
of the forced recruitment cases illustrates. 79 
III. THE FORCED RECRUITMENT CASES 
The principle question that cases involving forced recruitment 
by guerrillas raise is what constitutes political opinion under the 
Act. The BIA construes political opinion to mean that an individual 
affirmatively supports one of two opposing sides in a political con-
flict. sO In addition to this, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nizes as political opinion a stance which an opposing side attributes 
73 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court determined that the subjective element of the well-founded 
fear standard is satisfied if the alien attests to the fact that his or her fear is real. Obviously, 
this area is open to self-serving statements. It is therefore important that adjudicators accu-
rately assess the petitioner'S credibility. 480 u.s. at 431. This area is rather difficult: courts 
often confuse the question of whether evidence satisfies the burden of proof with whether 
evidence is believable. Anker & Blum, supra note 14, at 72. An adequate discussion of 
credibility issues is beyond the scope of this Note. Set' id. at 72-76 (discussing credibility 
analysis). 
74 Anker & Blum, supm note 14, at 69. 
751d. at 70. 
761d. at 445. 
77 In fact, it appears as if the Board is limiting discretionary denials of asylum in the 
absence of adverse factors. See discussion supra note 61. 
78 The INS admitted to discriminating against Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum-
seekers based on foreign policy objectives in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 
F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See also Susan Freinkel, INS Moving Away From Its No-Settle 
Strategy, N.]. L.]., Jan. 20, 1992, at 4. Moreover, the Board's stated resistance to change in 
this area is based on a fear of substantially increasing refugee admissions through a relaxation 
of standards. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13, INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 
90-1342). There is, however, another possible rationale for scrutinizing these claims more 
closely: preventing the circumvention of normal immigration procedures. The mere assertion 
of an asylum claim accords the alien rights to work and travel in the United States while his 
or her case is being adjudicated. If the claim is successful, the asylee is protected from 
prosecution for entering United States territory by knowingly circumventing immigration 
laws. In addition, asylees' access to permanent residency rights is expedited significantly in 
contrast to other immigrants who may be required to wait years to obtain this privilege. 
Martin, .Iupm note 16, at 1267-68. 1288-89. 
79 Anker & Blum, supra note 14, at 70. 
8fJ See Matter of Mogharrabi. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 448 (BIA 1987). 
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to an individual, whether or not the person actually holds it.81 This 
is imputed political opinion. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognizes neutrality as a third type of political opinion.82 This is an 
affirmative choice not to support any side.83 At issue in the forced 
recruitment cases is whether the refusal to engage in combat con-
stitutes a political choice for neutrality. 
A. Neutrality as Political Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit first examined the interpretation of "perse-
cution on account of ... political opinion" in the context of a Central 
American civil war in 1984. In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, a Salva-
doran asylum-seeker had been affiliated with both the army and a 
voluntary civilian police squad that aided the government in pre-
venting guerrilla infiltration.84 After severing his ties with these 
right-wing organizations, Bolanos-Hernandez was approached by 
the guerrillas who wanted him to use his conneCtions to infiltrate 
the government.85 The guerrillas told Bolanos-Hernandez that if 
he refused, they would kill him if he did not leave the country.86 
Because five of his friends, and possibly his brother, had been 
executed by the guerrillas under similar circumstances, Bolanos-
Hernandez fled El Salvador eight days later.87 
The Court of Appeals held that Bolanos-Hernandez's refusal 
to take sides in the civil war constituted neutrality.88 Moreover, the 
court found that by choosing neutrality Bolanos-Hernandez ex-
pressed an opinion and took a political stance, which was a political 
opinion for the purposes of granting relief under the Act.89 
In construing Bolanos-Hernandez's neutrality as a political 
opinion, the court evaluated the applicant's persecution claim under 
a four-pronged test to determine: 1) if there was a threat to life or 
freedom, .2) if it was made by the government or a group that the 
government was unable to control, 3) if the persecution resulted 
from the petitioner'S political beliefs, and 4) if the petitioner was a 
danger or a security risk to the United States.90 Under the third 
81 Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985). 
82 Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984). 
8S Id. 




88Id. at 1287. 
89Id. 
90 Id. at 1284. 
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prong of this standard, the Court of Appeals noted that Bolanos-
Hernandez had consciously chosen not to join either side in the 
conflict.91 The court was careful, though, to distinguish this neu-
trality from mere political indifference.92 The court acknowledged 
that a lack of political involvement in some instances could conceiv-
ably not constitute neutrality under this standard.93 The court re-
fused to elaborate on the distinction, however.94 Rather, the court 
determined on these facts that Bolanos-Hernandez's neutrality was 
a sufficiently overt manifestation of a political stance for the pur-
poses of granting asylum.95 In arriving at this decision, the Ninth 
Circuit attempted to broaden the standard for determining what 
constitutes political opinion under the Act. 
B. The BIA'S Forced Recruitment Jurisprudence 
1. The Board's Political Opinion Standard 
The Board, on the other hand, did not embrace the Ninth 
Circuit's neutrality doctrine.96 After the Supreme Court's Cardoza-
Fonseca decision, the BIA revised the test it had previously set forth 
in Matter of Acosta for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of political opinion.97 In Matter of Mogharrabi, the Board 
held, under its reformulated four-pronged standard, that the pe-
titioner must furnish evidence "1) that the alien possesses a belief 
or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means 
of punishment of some sort; 2) that the persecutor is already aware, 
or could ... become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or 
characteristic; 3) that the persecutor has the capability of punishing 
the alien; and 4) that the persecutor has the inclination to punish 
the alien."98 
91 [d. at 1286. 
92 [d. at 1287 n.18. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. 
95 [d. at 1287. 
96 See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
97 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 216 (BIA 1985). Mogharrabi's well-founded fear standard is 
virtually identical to the Acosta standard except that the second element no longer contains 
the phrase "could easily become aware." Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 
(BIA 1987). The BIA changed the second requirement by omitting the word "easily" from 
that phrase in order to lighten the applicant's burden of proof to conform with Cardozo,-
Fonseca. [d. 
98 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987) (granting asylum to Iranian student who dem-
onstrated against the Khomeini government). 
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In devising this test, the BIA took pains to distinguish this fear 
from fear arising from retribution over purely personal matters or 
from the general conditions of violence and unrest in the country 
at large.99 The latter fear would not constitute the basis for a claim 
of persecution on account of political opinion. loo The Board in 
Mogharrabi also determined that an asylum applicant demonstrates 
a well-founded fear of persecution by showing that a reasonable 
person in similar circumstances would fear persecution. lol Thus, in 
Mogharrabi, the BIA implicitly seemed to reject the Ninth Circuit's 
determination that neutrality was a political opinion by asserting 
that an asylee must actually possess a belief which a persecutor 
opposes on political grounds. 
2. The Forced Recruitment Cases 
The BIA first applied its analysis to a case involving forced 
recruitment by Central American guerrillas in 1988 in Matter of 
Maldonado-Cruz.102 In that case, the Salvadoran asylum applicant 
was forcibly removed from his farm by a group of twenty-five 
insurgents. 103 He received two days' worth of indoctrination. 104 Dur-
ing that time, the guerrillas executed one of his friends, who had 
been similarly abducted, for attempting to escape. 105 On the follow-
ing day, Maldonado-Cruz accompanied the guerrilla unit on a raid 
for supplies on his home town.106 He fled to San Salvador the very 
next night. 107 Shortly after learning through some neighbors from 
his home area that the insurgents were looking for him, he left EI 
Salvador.108 Through letters from his mother, Maldonado-Cruz 
99 Id. at 447. 
[00 Id. 
IO[ Id. at 445. 
102 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988), rev'd, Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th 
Cir. 1989). The BIA only recognizes circuit court decisions as precedent within the circuit 
that issued them. This practice limits the effects of a court decision to one particular circuit, 
thus enabling the BIA to cite as precedent elsewhere its decisions that have already been 
overruled by a court of appeals. For example, Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th 
Cir. 1989) and Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988) are the same 
case, but have different holdings that reflect the different approaches of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the BIA. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 
F.2d 1292, 1297 nA (9th Cir. 1990). 
103 Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d at 789. 
[04 Id. 
105Id. at 789 n.!. 
[06 Id. at 789. 
107Id. 
108Id. 
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learned that the guerrillas continued to seek him out until she 
convinced them that he was abroad. 109 
The BIA refused to grant Maldonado-Cruz asylum status.ll° 
The Board noted that the guerrillas did not consider the petitioner 
to entertain any political belief that they found offensive. lll Rather, 
the Board determined that the insurgents' threat of harming Mal-
donado-Cruz stemmed from a need to maintain military disci-
pline. 112 Finding the punishment of deserters devoid of any intent 
to inflict harm on account of political opinion,113 the BIA denied 
the asylum applicant's claim. ll4 
Shortly after its decision in Maldonado-Cruz, the BIA under-
scored the same approach in Matter of Vigil. 115 In that decision, the 
Board denied asylum to a young male petitioner who claimed to be 
threatened by forced recruitment by guerrillas because he was neu-
tral in the Salvadoran civil war.ll6 Vigil cited three incidents as the 
basis of his claim of persecution on account of political opinion. ll7 
First, he feared for his life after having seen the decapitated corpse 
of a stranger who was his age. llB Second, guerrillas forcibly re-
cruited some participants at a soccer game that the petitioner missed 
due to illness. ll9 Third, a gun battle broke out in his home town 
between the insurgents and government forces on election day.120 
Vigil had to hide under his bed for eight hours in order to avoid 
injury. 121 
Noting the alien's admission that he had kept his neutrality 
secret, the BIA distinguished Vigil's neutrality from Bolanos-Her-
nandez' neutrality.122 The Board concluded that Vigil had not man-
ifested a political stance that was sufficiently public to have elicited 
persecution. 123 
109 [d. 
110 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 518 (BIA 1988). 
111 [d. at 514. 
112/d. at 517. 
113 /d. 
114 [d. at 518. 
115 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988). 




120/d. at 575-76. 
121 [d. at 576. 
122 [d. 
123/d. at 576-77. 
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The BIA also distinguished the guerrillas' intent to recruit from 
their intent to persecute. 124 The purpose of recruitment is to supply 
the insurgents with soldiers and not to persecute young men who 
are recruited. 125 The Board then held that recruitment did not 
constitute persecution on account of political opinion for the pur-
poses of the Act. 126 
Vigil and Maldonado-Cruz established that the BIA will examine 
the group's motivation for threatening the petitioner with harm in 
analyzing a claim of persecution on account of political opinion 
made in the context of a civil war under the Mogharrabi standard. 127 
The Board will not view every act of violence committed by the 
group as necessarily reflecting a desire to persecute. 128 Unless a 
group threatens to punish an individual for entertaining an oppos-
ing political stance, the BIA will not grant asylum claims on this 
ground. 129 These Board decisions set the stage for a direct confron-
tation with the Ninth Circuit's position on what constitutes perse-
cution on account of political opinion in this context. 
C. The Ninth Circuit's Forced Recruitment Jurisprudence 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the BIA's ap-
proach when it reviewed the Board's decision in Maldonado-Cruz. 130 
Relying on its own reasoning from Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,131 the 
court reversed the BIA's ruling and held that an alien fleeing forced 
recruitment by guerrillas was threatened with persecution on ac-
count of political opinion. 132 As in Bolanos-Hernandez, the Ninth 
Circuit looked to the general statutory intent of "persecution on 
account of ... political opinion" and found neutrality to be sufficient 
to constitute political opinion. 133 
Applying its analysis in Bolanos-Hernandez to the facts before it 
in Maldonado-Cruz, the Court of Appeals cited the petitioner's re-
fusal to join the guerrillas as a manifestation of his political opinion 
of neutrality. 134 The court noted that Maldonado-Cruz was 
124 [d. at 577. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 578. 
I27 [d. at 577-78; Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 191. & N. Dec. 509, 513 (BIA 1988). 
128 See Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 191. & N. Dec. at 513. 
129 [d. 
130 Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989). 
131 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). 
132 Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d at 791. 
133 [d. 
134Id. 
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abducted by the guerrillas against his will and that the insurgents 
persistently sought him out at his home after he escaped from 
them. 135 Consequently, the court held that the petitioner had satis-
fied both the clear-probability and the well-founded fear standards 
that he risked persecution on account of his neutral political be-
lief. 136 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis closely paralleled the BIA's test of 
persecution on account of political opinion in Mogharrabi in many 
ways. Succinctly stated, the Board requires that an alien possess a 
political belief of which a persecutor could become aware and which 
the persecutor has both the desire and ability to overcome. 137 In 
Bolanos-Hernandez and Maldonado-Cruz, the Court of Appeals found 
that the asylees' refusal to aid the guerrillas' cause was a political 
opinion, that their fleeing recruitment was an overt manifestation 
of that political stance, and that the guerrillas' killing of their friends 
under similar circumstances was an indication that the petitioners 
were reasonably at risk. '38 
The crucial difference between the two approaches lay in the 
understanding of what constitutes political opinion. Here the gap 
between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the BIA widened 
after Maldonado-Cruz. The Board in Maldonado-Cruz required a 
demonstration that a persecutor is acting pursuant to political mo-
tives for the applicant's claim to succeed. '39 In presenting its anal-
ysis, the BIA rejected the presumption that evidence of imminent 
punishment by itself is sufficient to prove persecution. 140 Rather, 
the Board discussed various reasons why the guerrillas might seek 
to punish an individual. '41 The BIA noted that punishing deserters 
was necessary to maintain order within the guerrilla unit.142 The 
Board concluded that the guerrillas had no intention to inflict harm 
on account of political opinion when they inflicted punishment in 
order to maintain military discipline. 143 
135Id. at 793. 
\36Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepts general documentary evidence as 
sufficient to establish an asylum claim. It requires more specific evidence of the likelihood 
that the alien is at serious risk in order to satisfy the clear-probability standard for withholding 
of deportation. It goes without saying that if an applicant meets the latter requirements, he 
or she satisfies the former as well. See infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
138 Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d at 791; Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286, 
1287 (9th Cir. 1984). 
139 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 513-14 (BIA 1988). 
14°Id. at 513. 
141Id. at 514-15. 
142Id. at 515. 
"3Id. at 517. 
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In rejecting the BIA's attempt to distinguish the disciplining of 
a deserter from persecution on account of political opinion, the 
Court of Appeals showed itself to be less inclined than the Board 
to look deeply into the nature of the threat. The court implied that 
once it had determined that a group was a "political entity," any 
punishment inflicted by the group would fall within the meaning 
of persecution on account of political opinion. 144 The court distin-
guished this from "random violence" by noting that the guerrillas 
had singled out the asylee for punishment. 145 By taking this ap-
proach, the court avoided scrutinizing the persecuting group's mo-
tives for its actions. 146 In 1990 the conflict over the importance of 
the oppressor's motivation finally came to a head in Zacarias v. 
INS. 147 
The BIA denied Elias Zacarias' claims for withholding depor-
tation and asylum relief because it concluded that Guatemalan guer-
rillas do not practice forced recruitment. 148 The denial was sup-
ported by a routine advisory letter from the State Department.149 
That letter mentioned in passing that forced recruitment was in 
fact practiced by Guatemalan guerrillas. 150 Citing this practice re-
ferred to in the letter, the Court of Appeals reviewed the BIA's 
factual findings under the "substantial evidence" standard 151 and 
found them substantially unreasonable. 152 
144 See Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989). 
145 [d. at 791-92. 
146 See id. at 791. 
147 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990); see discussion off acts supra notes 5-12 and accompanying 
text. 
148 /d. at 851. 
149 The letter reads in pertinent part: "The applicant alleges fear of persecution because 
of civil conflict that afflicts parts of Guatemala and has caused various hardships and dangers, 
including forced recruitment by opposing forces .... Persons who flee their homelands due 
to national armed conflicts in which they are random victims of violence, intimidation, or 
recruitment are not generally classifiable as refugees under U.S. law." /d. at 847. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. at 848. Prior to Elias Zacario.s, the Ninth Circuit reviewed BIA decisions under a 
"substantial evidence" standard. The Ninth Circuit's approach was a heightened standard, 
which permitted the court to review more readily denials of refugee relief if it determined 
that the immigration judge'S decision was not based on substantial evidence. Mendoza Perez 
v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, j., concurring). Other circuits generally 
showed BIA decisions more deference. [d. The Supreme Court put an end to this Ninth 
Circuit practice by explicitly ruling that a reviewing court may reverse only if the evidence 
is "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear." INS v. 
Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992). 
152 Zacario.s, 921 F.2d at 848. There is considerable irony in the court's approach. These 
letters are routine to the process and usually not understood as reflecting a very detailed 
analysis of a particular country's political situation. Moreover, the plain intent of the letter 
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In evaluating Elias Zacarias' claim, the Court of Appeals offered 
an alternative analysis to the Board's insistence on demonstrating 
the guerrillas' persecutory motive. In a rather sweeping statement, 
the court interpreted almost the entire line of Ninth Circuit forced 
recruitment cases as meaning that what constituted a persecuting 
group no longer needed to be restricted to a "political entity" or a 
"politically motivated group."153 The Zacarias court understood a 
persecuting group to be "a group which engages in violence."154 
The court inferred that a threat made by any individual member 
of such a group is made by the group as a whole, thereby obviating 
the need for any deeper scrutiny into the nature of the threat. 155 
Given the Court of Appeals' assessment of persecutory moti-
vation in Zacarias, certain parameters of the Ninth Circuit's analytic 
framework can be culled from these forced recruitment cases. First, 
the court did not inquire into the asylum-seeker's state of mind. 156 
The applicant's refusal to join a guerrilla unit sufficed to establish 
a political belief for which the alien may be persecuted. 157 
Second, the court accepted general documentary evidence, 
such as newspaper articles158 or routine State Department advisory 
letters,159 as satisfying the objective element of the "well-founded 
fear" standard for asylum eligibility.l60 More specific evidence of 
the frequency of forced recruitment in the country at large or 
among the petitioner's associates was needed to meet the clear-
probability standard for withholding deportation. 161 
in Elias Zacarias' case was to support a denial of his claim, not to promote it. See Martin, 
supra note 16, at 1310-13 (discussing the role of advisory letters in refugee adjudication). 
153 Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989). 
154 Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 851. 
155 [d. 
156 In articulating its political opinion analysis, the Bolanos-Hernandez court emphasized 
that this type of scrutiny should not extend to the motivation prompting the particular 
political choice for three reasons. First, it is not proper for the government to inquire into 
an individual's motives for a political decision. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 
1287 (9th Cir. 1984). Second, accurately evaluating the political an? nonpolitical dimensions 
of a particular stance is very difficult. [d. Finally and most importantly, persecutors are often 
indifferent to the individual's motivation. [d. It is usually the victim's actions, rather than his 
or her motives, which elicit the persecutory response. [d. As a result, in enumerating these 
concerns, the court in effect narrowed the focus of its political opinion inquiry to establishing 
that some overt manifestation of a consciously chosen position had taken place and that 
manifestation had resulted in a serious individualized threat to life or freedom from a political 
group. /d. 
157 Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d at 791. 
158 Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1288. 
159 Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1990). 
160 [d. at 855. 
161 [d. See discussion of clear-probability standard supra note 58. 
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Finally, the court focused more on the likelihood that the ap-
plicant would be at risk than on the persecutor's reasons for per-
petrating the oppression. 162 The Court of Appeals' decision in Za-
carias broadened this statutory basis for asylum eligibility beyond 
the approach that the Ninth Circuit had articulated to that point. 
Fearing the further relaxation of the Ninth Circuit's standard, the 
INS, in turn, petitioned the Supreme Court to review the dispute. 163 
IV. INS V. ELIAS ZACARIAS 
The Supreme Court affirmed the BIA's interpretation of "per-
secution on account of . . . political opinion" in the context of 
guerrilla recruitment in all respects. l64 In addressing the question 
of whether a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce performance 
of military service constituted persecution under the Act, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, rejected the Court of 
Appeals' characterization of such recruitment as "political kidnap-
ping."165 Instead, he noted that an individual may have many rea-
sons for wanting to resist recruitment. 166 Not all of these reasons 
are dearly politically motivated. 167 Unless an applicant can dem-
onstrate that he entertains a political opinion and is at risk of 
persecution for having that belief, the asylum-seeker cannot satisfy 
162 See Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1988). Citing the Supreme 
Court in Cardoza-Fonseca as suggesting that a one-in-ten chance of persecution occurring 
would make a fear well-founded, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated: "A specific 
verbal threat by the guerrillas directed at an individual whose identity and residence are 
known to the guerrillas is sufficient to create a well-founded fear." Id. . 
165 Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), cm. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). See 
discussion supra note 78. 
164 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992). 
165 See id. at 815. Ninth Circuit case law distinguished forced recruitment by guerrillas 
from apparently similar cases involving military conscription by a government. Mark R. von 
Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee Law: Political Opinion and the 
Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 13 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned that governments have the presumption of legitimacy. See Kaveh-Haghigy 
v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 u.S. 398, 416-37 (1964) (discussing "act of state" doctrine as precluding courts from 
sitting in judgment on a foreign government's acts within its own territory». The Court of 
Appeals has found that governmental conscription is justified as part of an effort at self-
defense. See id. (absent exceptional circumstances, government conscription of young men 
for military service is not persecution). Guerrilla units, in contrast, lack this presumption of 
legitimacy. The Court of Appeals has, consequently, characterized guerrillas' forced recruit-
ment practices as kidnapping. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988). The 
BIA, on the other hand, has never recognized this distinction. Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 
191. & N. Dec. 509, 517 (BIA 1988). 
166 INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992). 
167Id. 
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this statutory ground for relief. 168 Justice Scalia implied that these 
elements are unlikely to be satisfied in instances of forced recruit-
ment, because the petitioner must show that the guerrillas intend 
to "persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than 
because of his refusal to fight with them."169 
In substantially rejecting forced recruitment by guerrillas as a 
basis upon which claims of persecution on account of political opin-
ion can arise, the Supreme Court imposed an additional require-
ment on asylum claims. Henceforth, an asylum petitioner must show 
by either direct or circumstantial evidence that the oppressor's mo-
tives are political. 170 The mere existence of a generalized "political" 
motive underlying the oppressor's threat to the alien is insufficient 
to establish a claim of persecution. l7l In order to demonstrate the 
political aspect of the persecution with adequate clarity, the appli-
cant must establish a link between his or her own beliefs and the 
nature of harm with which he or she is threatened. 172 Thus, Elias 
Zacarias affirmed the BIA's position set forth in Matter of Maldonado-
Cruz, which held that "[i]n analyzing a claim of persecution made 
in the context of a civil war, it is necessary to look to the motivation 
of the group threatening harm."173 
The key to this analysis is an examination of the victim's motives 
for the behavior that elicits the oppression. 174 Justice Scalia sug-
gested that oppression can only reasonably be inferred to be polit-
ically motivated if the victim's conduct is clearly shown to be of a 
sufficiently political nature that it is likely to trigger a political 
response. 175 Victim behavior too far removed from an overt mani-
festation of political belief, in turn, casts suspicion on the political 
nature of the oppressor's motives. 176 
By focusing so closely on both the oppressor's and the victim's 
states of mind, the Supreme Court effectively makes these claims 
much harder to prove. Conceivably, the asylum applicant could be 
required to prove the motives of the leaders of the oppression in 
order to establish that a policy of persecution existed. The alien 
may also have to prove the motives of the particular individuals 
16SId. 
169Id. 
17°Id. at 817. 
I7IId. at 816. 
172 See id. 
173 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 513 (BIA 1988). 
174 See Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
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involved in the threatening activity in order to ascertain that they 
were not acting unilaterally or for some ulterior motive such as 
personal vendetta l77 or debt collecting. 178 
Requiring proof of the persecutor's intent magnifies, rather 
than ameliorates, the difficulties of establishing asylum claims. The 
problems of producing evidence in cases arising out of distant lands 
are exacerbated by the chaotic conditions of civil war. Merely de-
termining the identities of the persecutors could be formidable. 179 
Elias Zacarias, for example, was accosted by masked men.180 Scru-
tinizing their motives would be an even more exacting task. 
Moreover, evidence of persecution or threats of persecution is 
something that the oppressor would be eager to conceal in order 
to avoid subsequent prosecution. As the Bolanos-Hernandez court 
noted: "Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with 
affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution."181 
V. RECHARTING UNITED STATES REFUGEE RELIEF 
The approach the Court adopted in Elias Zacarias may well 
address the government's fear of substantially expanding the num-
ber of refugee admissions through a relaxation of standards. 182 The 
resulting constriction of this statutory ground for asylum eligibility, 
however, contravenes the U.N. refugee policy's purpose of confer-
ring humanitarian relief on displaced persons. 18!! It is these inter-
national standards which the Act was meant to incorporate into the 
immigration law of the United States. 184 
A. International Refugee Standards 
The United States acceded to United Nations refugee policy 
when it signed the 1967 Protocop85 in 1968.186 The Refugee Act of 
177 See Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988) (alien denied asylum 
because single guerrilla'S threatening activity not motivated by guerrilla unit's desire to recruit 
alien). 
178 Florez-de Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1986) (retribution for unpaid 
financial debt not political). 
179 Respondent's Counterstatement of the Question Presented at 13, INS v. Elias Zacarias, 
112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342). 
ISO Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990). 
181 Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
182 See supra note 78. 
185 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Support of Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 
90-1342) [hereinafter UNHCR Brief]. 
184 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra note 42. 
186 See Martin, supra note 16, at 1259. 
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1980 codified those international standards, as the legislative history 
indicates. 187 In 1987 the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 
interpreted the Act as conforming U.S. domestic law to United 
Nations policy.188 Moreover, the international community evaluates 
U.S. refugee policy in terms of its fidelity with United Nations 
standards. 189 It is therefore instructive to compare the Supreme 
Court's decision with current United Nations policy. 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees l90 (UNHCR) amicus curiae brief indicates that Elias Za-
carias frustrates United Nations policy in two ways.191 First, the 
Supreme Court has now in effect mandated that exiles meet higher 
standards of proof than the United Nations requires for conferring 
a humanitarian benefit. Second, in contrast to the United Nations 
position, the Elias Zacarias Court has substantially rejected forced 
recruitment as a political activity that can occasion refugee relief. 
1. Standards for Proving Persecution 
The High Commissioner construes the pertinent United Na-
tions language codified in the Act as conferring a humanitarian 
benefit on the asylum-seeker. 192 In using the phrase "well-founded 
fear," the UNHCR's emphasis is placed on the alien's state of mind 
in order to ascertain that he or she is afraid and that the fear is 
187 See supra note 29. See U.N. Definition supra note 42. 
188 480 U.S. 412, 436-40 (1987). 
189 The Supreme Court's decision has drawn international criticism. In a recent letter to 
the New York Times, the Chairman of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board, R. G. L. 
Fairweather, accused the Supreme Court of ignoring the United Nations refugee definition, 
which United States law domesticates, in reaching its decision in Elias Zacarias. R. G. L. 
Fairweather, Temporary Sanctuary Tends to Get Permanent; Political Persecution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
7, 1992, at 24. Mr. Fairweather concluded: "Most jurisdictions have held that refusal to join 
a guerrilla organization in like circumstances is evidence of a political opinion." [d. 
190 The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
created that office and authorized it to interpret and implement United Nations refugee 
policy. G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. Ai1775 (1950). The 
UNHCR provides protection and material aid to refugees in various parts of the world. It 
also monitors signatory States' procedures for making asylum determinations and intervenes 
on behalf of individual asylum-seekers. Martin, supra note 16, at 1254. 
191 The role which the UNHCR has played in United States asylum cases has changed 
over the past fifteen years. Under the Carter administration, the UNHCR exercised consid-
erable influence over the content of State Department advisory letters in cases involving 
Haitian applicants. This practice came to an end under the Reagan administration. Currendy, 
the UNHCR assists petitioners 1) by locating pro bono counsel; 2) by filing amicus curiae 
briefs in cases likely to have a significant effect on the asylum process; and 3) by advising 
petitioners' counsels on particular applications. Martin, supra note 16, at 1319-20. 
192 UNHCR Brief, supra note 183, at 16. 
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objectively reasonable. 193 Nothing in the language or the UNHCR's 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
(Handbook)194 interpretation of the language requires proof of the 
persecutor's intention in determining refugee status. 195 Indeed, 
such a requirement is incompatible with United Nations practice. 196 
The High Commissioner contends that to do otherwise would 
essentially mandate standards of proof similar to a criminal law 
inquiry into the persecutor's mens rea. 197 But the purpose of inter-
national refugee law is to grant relief to the victim, not to convict 
the oppressor. 198 Requirements of persecutory intent would more 
likely than not frustrate this goal in many meritorious cases. In the 
alternative, the High Commissioner requires that there only be 
some nexus between a political stance and the feared persecution. 199 . 
Proof of the persecutor's motive is merely a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, element in establishing this nexus.200 
2. Recognition of Forced Recruitment by Guerrillas as 
Persecution on Account of Political Opinion 
Focusing more precisely on the issue at hand, the High Com-
missioner points out that the United Nations acknowledges that 
forced recruitment by guerrillas may be a form of persecution on 
account of political opinion.201 Citing the Handbook, the brief main-
tains that absent an explicit verbal expression, the applicant's con-
duct as a whole may be understood to imply an adverse political 
belief.202 Thus, it is possible that the refusal to join a guerrilla unit 
would be perceived· by the insurgents as an indication of "anti-
guerrilla" sentiment.203 Therefore, "[ r ]egardless of the precise char-
acterization of an individual's motives, the conscious refusal to join 
193 UNHCR Brief, supra note 183, at 11-12. This approach replicates the Supreme 
Court's analysis of this standard in Cardoza-Fonseca. See discussion of well-founded fear 
standard supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
194 UNHCR doc. HCRlIP/4/Eng., Geneva, 1979. 
195 UNHCR Brief, supra note 183, at 12. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. at 16. 
198 [d. 
199 [d. at 4. 
200 [d. at 15. 
201 [d. at 19. 
202 [d. at 18-19. 
203 Id. at 19. 
1993] ASYLUM-SEEKERS 309 
a guerrilla group inevitably places the individual in political oppo-
sition to that group."204 
This results in an analytical framework in which the state of 
mind of the persecutor is not important. 205 Rather, the focus is on 
the asylum-seeker's behavior and his or her fear of the oppression 
it may elicit.206 This feared oppression becomes persecution when 
an act or a threat of violence is specifically directed towards an 
individual by either government or antigovernment forces. 207 These 
elements form the contours of the nexus between political belief 
and the feared persecution.208 It is this nexus which distinguishes 
persons qualifying for refugee status under international law from 
individuals fleeing generalized conditions of violence in a country 
torn by civil strife.209 
B. Repudiation of United Nations Position 
The Supreme Court rejected the United Nations standard of 
proof for conferring refugee relief by requiring some evidence of 
the persecutor's intent.210 The Court also found that forced guer-
rilla recruitment is not necessarily a form of persecution on account 
of political opinion.211 The Elias Zacarias Court arrived at its decision 
by relying on the plain language of the Refugee Act of 1980.212 The 
Court chose this approach in spite of the Act's legislative history, 
which indicated that the Act was designed to domesticate United 
204 Id. at 18 (emphasis in the original text). Justice Scalia takes exception to this. INS v. 
Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) ("That seems to us not ordinarily so, since we do 
not agree with the dissent that only a 'narrow, grudging construction of the concept of 
'political opinion," ... would distinguish it from such quite different concepts as indifference, 
indecisiveness and risk-averseness."). 
The question of when a rejection of tactics, such as the use of armed force, implies a 
rejection of the political goals which those tactics are intended to achieve is open to debate. 
Determining motivation can be a complicated and imprecise task. The issue probably can 
best be decided on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, the difficulty of ascertaining motives 
should not obscure the fact that persecutors are often indifferent to the individual's moti-
vation. It is usually the victim's actions, rather than his or her motives, which elicit the 
persecutory response. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984). 
205 UNHCR Brief, supra note 183, at 11. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 20. 
208 Id. at 17. 
209 Id. at 20. 
210 INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992). 
211Id. at 816. 
212 Id. 
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Nations refugee standards.213 The Elias Zacarias Court's interpre-
tation of the Act also ignored the Supreme Court's earlier decision 
in Cardoza-Fonseca, which accorded a greater deference to the 
United Nations position on matters involving refugees.214 By nar-
rowly adhering to the text of the Act, however, the Court avoided 
having to consider more generous international humanitarian stan-
dards which would have conflicted with the result the Elias Zacarias 
majority wanted to effectuate. 
Three dissenting justices objected to the constriction of asylum 
eligibility as being contrary to the spirit of Cardoza-Fonseca. 215 By 
interpreting the plain language of the Act as narrowing the grounds 
for asylum eligibility in this area, the Elias Zacarias Court turned 
away from the Cardoza-Fonseca Court's call for the creation of "a 
broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of 
asylum."216 
Writing for the dissent in Elias Zacarias, Justice Stevens also 
criticized Justice Scalia's method of interpretation as running con-
trary to ordinary canons of statutory construction.217 In delivering 
the Court's opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens listed the 
factors relevant to interpreting the 1980 Act.218 They are "the plain 
language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, 
and its legislative history."219 To these Justice Stevens added the 
"longstanding principle of construing ambiguities in deportation 
statutes in favor of the alien."22o Given the broader scope which 
these principles of interpretation call for, Justice Stevens concluded 
that Elias Zacarias' refusal to join the guerrilla forces constituted a 
political opinion under the Act.221 The dissent's exposition of the 
disparity between the Court's rulings in Elias Zacarias and Cardoza-
Fonseca highlights the abrupt change in United States refugee policy, 
which the Supreme Court apparently seeks to achieve. 
2U See discussion supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. 
214 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. 421. 436-40 (1987). "[O)ne of Congress' primary 
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees .... " [d. at 436. 
215 INS v. Elias Zacarias. 112 S. Ct. 812. 818 (1992) (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
216 Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. at 424. 
217 Elias Zacarias. 112 S. Ct. at 819 (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
218 Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. at 449. 
219 Elias Zacarias. 112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens. J.. dissenting) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca. 480 U.S. 421. 449 (1987)). 
220 [d. at 819 (Stevens. J.. dissenting) (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. at 449). 
221 [d. (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
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VI. A SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 
A. Overturning Elias Zacarias 
In light of the foregoing, some commentators have called for 
Congress to overturn the Elias Zacarias decision.222 Domesticating 
the United Nations refugee policy by merely giving congressional 
authorization to the Ninth Circuit's Zacarias standard, however, 
would not address the serious reservations that other circuits have 
with this attempt to distinguish being at risk because of one's polit-
ical views by using such an inexact analysis.223 
The line of cases culminating in the Court of Appeals' Zacarias 
decision required an alien to establish that he or she was at risk 
because a political entity had singled him or her out for punish-
ment.224 This approach focused on showing that the applicant 
would truly be subject to harm if repatriated.225 Considerably less 
emphasis was given to demonstrating that the asylum-seeker had 
overtly manifested a political stance or that the group was seeking 
to punish him or her because of that position.226 
In fact, proving the political dimension of a claim based on 
persecution on account of political opinion under this theory be-
came practically unnecessary. If the alien could show that he or she 
was likely to suffer great harm, he or she needed only further 
establish that the oppressor had some affiliation with a political 
groUp.227 The fact that the asylum-seeker had been singled out for 
persecution was sufficient to distinguish this risk of harm from the 
risk imposed on the general populace facing the daily dangers of 
living in a country in the throes of a civil war.228 
This set a generous standard of refugee relief. As a result, the 
BIA and most courts were reluctant to follow the Ninth Circuit's 
222 E.g., Craig A. Fielden, Note, Persecution on Account of Political Opinion: "Refugee" Status 
After INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), 67 WASH. L. REv. 959, 978 (1992); E.g., Bret 
I. Parker, Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias Zacarias: A Departure From 
the Past, FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1275, 1311 (1992). 
225 E.g., Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (lith 
Cir. 1990) (requiring proof of persecutor's intent). 
224 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra note 146. 
m; See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
227/d. 
228Id. 
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approach.229 Indeed, one court decried it as a "sinkhole that would 
swallow the law."23o 
B. A Modified Mogharrabi Approach 
It is possible to craft a suitable standard based on Board prec-
edent that avoids many of the pitfalls of both the Supreme Court's 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions. Moreover, this 
approach conforms more closely with the United Nations position 
for conferring humanitarian relief because it imposes a less de-
manding nexus between the victim's belief and the persecutory 
activity. A discussion of recent BIA decisions will illustrate the ad-
vantages of this alternative. 
1. Mogharrabi Revisited 
The Elias Zacarias decision goes beyond the standard for de-
termining persecution on account of political opinion that the BIA 
set forth in Matter of Mogharrabi. By requiring proof of the oppres-
sor's motivation, the Court has created a greater burden for aliens 
who have been subject to actual persecution than it requires for 
aliens who have established that they are at risk, but who have not 
been actually pursued by an oppressor. 
In Matter of Mogharrabi, the Board granted asylum to an Iranian 
student.231 The petitioner had participated in anti-Khomeini dem-
onstrations in the United States and had engaged in an acrimonious 
political discussion with an official in the Iranian Interests Section 
of the Algerian Embassy in Washington, D.C.232 The asylee pre-
sented no evidence that he had ever experienced persecution as a 
result of these incidents. Indeed, the BIA acknowledged that it was 
not certain that the Iranian government was even aware that the 
applicant had been involved in these events.233 Nevertheless, the 
Board held that a reasonable person in these circumstances could 
fear persecution if his activities had become known to the Iranian 
government, because Khomeini's regime was known frequently to 
oppress its political opponents.234 
229 Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, j., concurring). 
230 Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (lith Cir. 
1990). 
231 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 449 (BIA 1987). 
232 !d. at 447. 
233 See id. at 448. 
234 [d. 
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In arriving at this determination, the Board found that the 
asylee had satisfied its four-pronged standard in the following man-
ner.235 First, the student had manifested a political opinion by ar-
guing in the Algerian Embassy and by participating in anti-Khom-
eini demonstrations. 236 Second, these manifestations were 
sufficiently public that a foreign government thousands of miles 
away might become aware of them.237 The BIA held that the third 
and fourth elements of its standard were met because the Khomeini 
government was generally known to oppress its political opponents 
with some degree of regularity.238 
The Board engaged in no discussion of whether the form which 
the asylum-seeker's political opposition took was one which rou-
tinely elicited a persecutory response from the Iranian government. 
Many governments frequently seek to punish individuals who op-
pose them by means of violence. Fewer governments attempt to 
inflict harm on those who express their opposition in other ways. 
In Mogharrabi, the Board did not even bother to determine whether 
the petitioner's behavior was sufficiently similar to the behavior of 
others whom the Khomeini regime had persecuted for their political 
activities in the asylee's homeland. 
The BIA also made no inquiry to determine if the Iranian 
government had ulterior, nonpolitical motives for wanting to punish 
Mogharrabi. Once the applicant had demonstrated a political opin-
ion against a regime that was generally known to harm its oppo-
nents, the Board concluded that the alien was sufficiently at risk to 
be awarded asylum. 
2. Forced Recruitment's Impact on Mogharrabi 
If the Elias Zacarias decision goes beyond the Board's approach 
in Mogharrabi, the BIA itself took the first steps towards developing 
the standard in that direction. Since Bolanos-Hernandez, the BIA and 
the courts have struggled with distinguishing being at risk because 
of the general level of violence in a war-torn country from being at 
risk because of one's political views.239 In an attempt to address this 
issue, the Board applied Mogharrabi to cases involving forced 
235 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
236 Matter of Mogharrabi. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439. 448 (BIA 1987). 
237 ld. 
OS81d. 
239 See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277. 1284 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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recruitment by guerrillas by expanding its approach to require a 
more explicit showing of the persecutor's motives.24o 
Although the BIA broadened the Mogharrabi test to defeat 
asylum claims in guerrilla recruitment cases such as Maldonado-Cruz 
and Vigil,241 the Board was careful not to fly in the face of Bolanos-
Hernandez. Bolanos-Hernandez made a deliberate and considered 
decision not to join either side in the civil war in El Salvador.242 He 
severed his ties to the right-wing organizations with which he had 
been affiliated and refused to use his connections to infiltrate the 
government on the rebels' behalf. 243 Vigil, on the other hand, did 
not express his desire to remain neutral to anyone when he was in 
El Salvador.244 He fled his country because he feared for his life if 
he were forced to fight in either the guerrilla or government 
forces. 245 In distinguishing Bolanos-Hernandez from Vigil, the Board 
maintained that an asylee must articulate and affirmatively take a 
political position, even one of neutrality, and that the alien must 
demonstrate that he could be "singled out" for persecution because 
of that position.246 Thus, in Vigil the BIA indicated that an asylum 
claim might be successfully advanced under this standard III re-
cruitment cases similar to Bolanos-Hernandez.247 
C. An Alternative Approach 
It is possible to carve out an alternative to the Supreme Court's 
position, which imposes on the alien an almost insurmountable 
burden of proof, and the Ninth Circuit's approach in Zacarias, which 
may not adequately filter out non meritorious asylum claims. In fact, 
the BIA's standard as originally applied in Mogharrabi is a position 
that essentially avoids the excesses of these two alternatives. That 
approach could be modified to require an alien to show that he or 
she has affirmatively taken a political stance, of which an oppressor 
.40 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 513 (BIA 1988). 
'41 See discussion supra notes 102-29 and accompanying text. 
'4'Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286,1287 n.18 (1984) . 
• 4. Id. at 1287. 
'44 Matter of Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572, 577 (BIA 1988). 
'4'Id. 
'46Id. at 576-77. The BIA held that satisfying these two elements was a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for establishing Vigil's asylum claim based on persecution on account 
of political opinion. The Board also noted that the alien needed to demonstrate that the 
guerrillas' desire to harm him was rooted in something more than the alien's attempt to 
evade recruitment.Id. at 577 . 
• 47 See id. at 577. 
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could become aware, and that he or she has been singled out for 
harm by a political group.248 No additional proof ofthe persecutor's 
motivation, either circumstantial or direct, should be necessary. 
Rather, once these circumstances have been established, the peti-
tioner should be granted asylum absent some evidence that he or 
she is at risk for nonpolitical reasons. 
Commentators have noted that requiring evidence of the per-
secutor's state of mind often shifts the discussion in asylum adju-
dication away from the life-threatening situations that confront 
many asylum applicants.249 Creating an inference in favor of an 
oppressor's persecutory motives absent clear evidence to the con-
trary would reorient that discussion to an examination of the se-
verity of the risk which the alien faces. 25o This refocusing would 
address more directly the central purpose of United States refugee 
law: protecting those who are at serious risk.251 
The creation of such an inference and the proof that the alien 
has been singled out for harm by a political group, however, are 
insufficient to settle the case. Some evidence that the applicant has 
affirmatively taken a political stand that the oppressing group seeks 
to overcome should be necessary to distinguish asylees from those 
fleeing the general level of violence in their homeland. 
Under this proposed standard, refugee relief would still be 
awarded in cases of forced guerrilla recruitment like Bolanos-Her-
nandez. It would be denied in cases like Vigil and Elias Zacarias. This 
manner of distinguishing between these two sets of cases, however, 
would not require proof of the persecutor's state of mind, which 
the Supreme Court now seems willing to impose not only on asylum 
claims based on persecution on account of political opinion, but also 
on claims based on persecution on account of religion.252 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The eight-year struggle to craft a standard for granting asylum 
to aliens fleeing forced recruitment has had a profound effect on 
the development of persecution on account of political opinion 
under the Refugee Act. The particular problems presented by these 
248Id. at 576-77. 
249 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asylum Law, 3 
INT'LJ. REFuGEE L. 5, 23 (1991). 
250 See id. at 24. 
mId. at 25. 
252 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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cases have skewed the debate about what constitutes a valid asylum 
claim. By requiring proof of the persecutor's intent, the Supreme 
Court has laid a heavy burden on those seeking humanitarian relief. 
This higher standard distorts the purpose of the Act, which is to 
bestow protection on those at serious risk because of their political 
beliefs. 
An alternative way of resolving forced recruitment cases, and 
other asylum claims based on persecution on account of political 
opinion generally, is to return to the BIA's Mogharrabi standard. 
Demonstrating that an alien has affirmatively assumed a political 
stance for which he risks persecution is an easier task than produc-
ing evidence of an oppressor's motives. While this approach differs 
from the more generous United Nations standard, it avoids the 
egregious constriction of asylum relief fashioned by the Elias Zacar-
ias Court. 
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